In this paper we present various results on interpolation and definability which generalize the well-known theorems of Craig [5] and Beth [ 1]. ~I'he proofs a~re almost entirely model-theoretic, and rely heavily on the use of special mode:Is (see [ 1 5] ). Statements of some known results we will refer to are included in § 1. Our basic result is the Main Lemma 2.2 of § 2 characterizing subsets of special models definable by infinite conjunctions. The Main Lemma is reformulated as Theorem 2.3 on Z l-definable subsets. These results are applied in § 3 to yield interpolation-type theorems, such as Theorem 3.2, which concern certain second-order conditions whose only second-order quantifiers are unicersal. 111
§ 1. Preliminaries
We consider a finitary first-order predicate language L (with identity) which is fixed throughout the paper. Models for the language L will be denoted by 9~, ~, .... We will follow ~he convention that the universe of 9~ is A, that of ~ is B, etc. We assume familiarity with the basic concepts of model theory, and also the notion of special model (from [ 15 ] ). For the most part we employ standard terminology anc~ notations; for example, we use ~ for isomorphism, = for elementary equivalence, -< for elementary submodel, and I Xl for the cardinality of a set X. We use ~ both for the relation of satisfiability in a model (9J ~ ~p(al, ..., a k) where a I , ..., a k e A) and for the (semantic) relation of consequence (T ~ ~ where T is a theory). In the rest of this section we explain some other notations and cc, nventions, give some facts about special models, and state some known results on definability md interpolation.
If R is a k-place predicate symbol not belonging to L, then L(R) is the new language formed by adding R to L. Models for L(R) will be written as (9~, R), where R is a k-place relation on A. Similarly, if we are given a sequence R0, RI, ... of new predicates, we form the new language L(R0, R1, ...), whose models are written ( 9.t, R0, R 1 , ...).
We will assume throughout that P, Q, R, and S (sometimes with subscripts) are distinct predicate symbols which do not occur in L. In addition, P and Q ,~re assumed to be unary.
In writing formulas of these expanded languages we will sometimes exhibit the new predicate symbols. For example, a formula of L(P) may be written as ~(P). ~(Q) would then be the formula of L(Q) obtained by substituting Q everywhere it: ¢ for P~ Added predicates will also be treated at times as second-order variables, and we will form second-order sentences such as ] P q~(P).
We also sometimes exhibit the free (individual) variables of a formula, writing ~(ot, ..., u k) for ~. Using the notation q~(vt, ..., v k) will imply that the only free variables of ¢ are ~1, ..., °k (but v 1 .... , v k need not all occur free in ¢0. We also use x, y, and z for variables.
Given formulas ¢1, ..., q~n we will write A q~i an~ V 4~i the (possibly infinite) conjunction and disjunction of all the formulas ¢i. The satisfaction of these infinitary formulas in a model is defined by the obvious extension of the t~sual definition for finitary formulas. We use ::1 <_n x ¢ as an abbreviation for an expression meaning "there are at most n x such that ¢". Similarly, 3 !x ¢ means "there is exactly one x such that ¢". We always use n, k, and m to denote natural numbers, that is, elements of co. The empty set is denoted by O.
If T is a theory of L(P) and PI is any model (thai is, model for L) then we define MT(?~)={P~A • (~[,P)~ T}.
More generally, if T is a theory of some language containing L(P), say L(P, R, ...), then by MT(~[)we mean the set of allPC_ A such that (PI, P) can be expanded to some model (~[, P, R, ...) of T.
We ass¢~me througho~at that T is a theory in L(P) or in some language containing L(P). Hence for any T the set Mr(9[ ) is unamhiguously defined for every ~[. If (gJ, P) is any model for L(P) then we define M(~[, P) = {P' C A • (~l, P) ~ (M,P')}.
Therefore P' e M(9~, P) if and only if there is an automorphism of 9.1 mapping P onto P'. Notice that P is always an eleme~.t of
M(Pl, P), but that MT(gff) may be empty. But if (~[, P) is a model of T, then 3~/(9A, P) c_C_ MT(Pi ).
We will freely use some facts from [ 15 ] about special models without explicit mention. Among them are the facts that every consistent theory has special models ("existence"), that elementarily equivalent special models of the same power are isomorphic ("uniqueness"), and that if 9~ is special and a e A then (P~, a) is also special. We also use the fact that special models are "relationuniversal", that is:
If P~f is special and ff -~', then for any relation (U) R' on A' there is some relation R on A such that ( 
9.t,R)-(P(',R').
Now, actually it is only proved in [ 15] that special models of certain cardinalities are relation-uPiversal (namely those cardinalities in which any theory ~ ~he language has a special model, in which case it is immediate by uniqueness). This would be enougb for most of our purposes, only making it necessary to add this cardinality restriction to the Main Lemma 2.2 and Theorem 2.3. However, (U) is true in general, so we here indicate the proof.
Let ?[ be special, and assume for simplicity that K = IAI > ILl u co. Let P:[' -P~ and R' be given. By the downward Lbwenheim-Skolem theorem we may assume that !A'[ < IAI. We construct a sequence { (?~ ~, R~)} of models and a ~en-,-,~'-{ f~.
}~_.~_...~,. of functions, each of length K (or cofinality of x if ~ is singular) such that the following hold: (P10, R0) = (~l', R'), (~*v, Rv) -< (Pry, Rv) for v </~, IA I <~, f~ is an elementary map of ~v into 92, fvc_f, for v</a, and every a e A is in the range of some fv.
The construction of these sequences offers no serious difficulties, using, say, the characterization of special models given by remark (5)in [15] . Now let ff"=U 9/v, R"=U Rv, g=Ufv"
Then (92', R') < ( 9/", R") and g is an isomorphism of 9/" onto 92.
Letting R be the image of R" under g, we have (gJ, R) g (91 ", R"), and so (92, R) = (92', R') as desired. The case IAI = ILI u w offers a few more complications but is not essentially different.
The case w _< IAI < ILI can be reduced to the previous cases by finding a language L' _c L such that i L'I u ¢o <_ I A I and every symbol of L -L' is definable in ~ by those of L' alone. This reduction depends on the fact that '~, being special, must realize every type in finitely many variables which is consistent with it. Hence, there can be at mo~t [ (ii) There is a formula ~p(x) of L such that
Beth proved this theorem only for theories T in the language L(P). The extension to theories T in any language containing L(P) is due to Craig [ 5] , and follows naturally from his proof of the theorem using his interpolation theorem. Beth's theorem is true also for predicates of any (finite) number of ptaces, not just unary predicates. The same is true for all the other definability results ir~ this paper. We have stated them just for unary predicates solely for ease of p~esentation. Similarly, in Craig's theorem R and S could be replaced by sequences of new and all different predicates (also, of course, functions and individual constants). This co~:~ment also will apply to the interpolation results we will give later.
Notice that the strongest conditior~ cn the interpolating formula of Theorem 1.2 is obtair, ed t;~y takitag L to be the language containing only the non-logical constants (that i':;, the predicate, function, and individual constant symbols) which, occur in both ¢ and X. Thus, ~b contains only the non-logical constants common to ~k and X.
The following theorem is similar to "[heorem 1.1 but concerns M(~I~, P); condition (i) says that P is lett fixed by the automorphisms of 9~. Theorem 1.3 (Svenonius [ 22 ] 
Svenonius' theorem also holds for theories T in any language containing L(P), it being understood in this case that the requirement in (i) that (~, P) is a model of T means that P e Mr193 
/Ej
Hence (ii) holds.
If (92, P) is also special then a compactness argummt can be used to show that in (ii) a single formula ¢(x) suffices to define P. From this fact, as is well-known, one can derive Beth's and Svenonius' theorems. If not, there would be some model (92', P') of T o u T and some b' ~ P' satisfying all X! in 9.1 '. But then 92 -9~' and therefore, since 9.1 is relation-universal, we could find P ~ A and b e P such that ( 9J~ P) ~ T and aZ ~ A x/(b), thus contradicting (2). A few comments are in order. First, P need not be a unary predicate, and T may be a theory in any language containing L(P), provided we add the restriction that IAI is at least as large as the number of new symbols added. These improvements a;e both clear from the proof. Also, the dual of the Lemma, obtained by ~eplac-ing U by f'l and A by V, cleaIly holds. Notice that the hypothesis on Q is that it be defined by the second-order (a~.~ in general ~n-finitary) formula 3P[ T(P) ^ P(x)]. The following theorem is a reformulation of the Main Lemma treating the case of an arbitrary ~ formula. In this connection the author wishes to mention that the formulations given here of the Main Lemma and Theorem 2.3 have been much improved by comments and suggestions of C.C.Chang.
(e) Let 0(S) be a formula containing a k-place predicate S. Let S* be a new (k + 1 )-place predicate. Recall the well-known equivalence Vz 3S 0(S) ~-~ 3S*Vz0*(S*), where 0* is the formula resulting from 0 by replacing S(tl,..., t k) everywhere by S*(z, t 1 , ..., t k), for any terms tl, ..., t k, assuming z is not bound in 0. The effect of this is to show that if 0(RI, ..., Rk,y , Zl, ..., z m ) is a formula of L(R1, ..., Rk) , then any second-order formula obtained from 0 by quantifying R1, ..., R k , z l, ..., 7, n in any order, provided the R i are quantified existentially, is equivalent to a formula 3 R~ ... 3 R E 0", where 0* is a (first-order) formula of L(R~, ..., R~) with just y free. Fherefore, by Remark (a), Theorem 2.3 applies also to such more general secc, nd-order formulas. This remark will be used in the next section in d.~living Lemma 3.1 * (f) Notice that the equivalence in the Main Lemma or Theorem 2.3 does not hold in general for models which are not spec:al. Also, in Theorem 2.3 we may not allow universal second-order quantifiers to occur in addition to the existential ones. In this connection we refer the reader to Svenonius [23] for a reduction of ~ ~ sentences on countable models. Also, it is interesting to note that, assuming we have only predicate symbols, any secondorder sentence which can be written in prenex form with only universal first-order quantifiers (but arbitrary second-order quantitiers) is logically equivalent to an infinite cow, junction of up.iversal first-order sentences (see [ 7 ] page 141). This fact depends essentially on the well-known special properties of universal first-order formulas. § 3. Interpolation
The interpolation theorems we give here ger.,~.ralize t5 raig's Theorem 1.2 in that we require that the implication from ff to X hold only for some ~:hoices of individuals, not for all. The resulting conditions are therefore second-order, biat our results show that they are reducible to finitary first-order statements.
Before proceeding to the results which actually generalize Craig's theorem, we require the following, a sort of "one-sided" interpolation theorem.
Lemma 3.1. Let 0(R, y) be a formula of L(R). Then the following are equivalent: As usual, we have simplified the statement of this result. The analogues of the remarks at the end of § 2 all hold here too. In particular, the single quantifiers 3y and V R could each be replaced by sequences of similar quantifiers (Remark (a)), and 0 ~ould be an infinite disjunction (Remark (c)). The latter fact implies that if T o is any theory of L then the eq~aivalence of (i) and (ii) continues to hold if we require the statements to be consequences of T o rather than universally valid. Although similar remarks apply to the other results of this section and will be used in applications in the next section, we will no longer explicitly mention them.
The next result is our basic generalization of Craig's interpolation theorem. The last sentence may be rewritten as
D.W.K~eker, Generalized inte,'polation and definability
and then an application of Theorem 1.2 yields the desired formula ¢(x, y) of L.
Instead of appealing here to Craig's theorem we could derive it from Theorem 2.3 as follows. Assume that
This is the same as t = 3 R qJ(R, x) ~ 'q Sx(S, x).
By Theorem 2.3 there are formulas c~i(x) of L (i ~ I) whose conjunction is equivalent to 3 R qJ(R, x) on every special 9~, and hence
9d. ~ [3R$-: A q~i] ^ [ A ¢i ~ VSx] • iEI i~l
We may drop the superfluous second-order quantifiers, and ther~ a compactness argument shows that some finite conjunction of the '~i will interpolate between ~ and ×. Notice that (ii) is stronger than (iii) since it yields not only an interpolating formula ~ but also an L-definable set ofy's for which the implications hold. Also, (ii) implies that ~b -~ X is true for all y. Because of this, one can find examples of an interpolating formula 4~ which will work in (iii), but which will not work in (ii) for any a.
Also notice that the following is true: if in (i) the single implication qJ -~ × is replaced by a finite conjunction of implications ~ki -~ ×i (i = 1, ..., n) then in (ii) we can find interpolating formulas ¢i (i --1, ..., n) which all work with the same formula a. It is this slight generalization of Theorem 3.2 which is actually used in the next section.
There are situations which vary somewhat flom the one in Theoreln 3.2 in which we also may interpolate. For example, there is the following, whichwill also be applied in the next section. Chang has proved a gcnera!ization of the equivalence of (i) and (iii) in Theorem 3.2. In this generalization, annovnced in [3] , the prefix ::ly is replaced by an arbitrarj quantifier p.efix, al!owing also second-order quantifiers provided they are uaiversal. We subsequently succeeded in generalizing Theorem 3.2, including condition (ii), to this situation. In fact, the resulting theorem, Theorem 3.4, also generalizes Theorem 3.3 above. Our proof, which is quite different from Chang's, depends upon first giving a corresponding generalizaticn of Lemma 3.1. Continuing in this fash~.on we get a0, ol, .... o h satisfying (ii).
From this the desired generalization of Tiaeorem 3.2 follows easily. Changes theorem of [3] is the equivalence of (i) and (iii) (without the further condition on q~). The remaining remarks concern possible improvements and extensions of the results of this section.
(c) One question concerning Theorem 3.4 which arises immediately is whether one can require (at least in (iii)) that the interpolant contains only the non-logical constants occurring in both ~ and X. The following example shows that in general this improvement is not possible.
Let L have only identity. Let 0 be the sentence of L saying that the uni~,erse has exactly three elements, let r0(P) be the sentence of L(P) syaing that P has exactly one element, and let r 1 (Q) be the senter.ce of L(Q) saying that Q has exactly two elements. Then the following holds:
~: 'tiP, Q :lyVx(O ^ ro(P ) a [P(y) < , P(x)] "-> ['r 1 (Q) ~ Q(x)] ).
In fact, given (af, P, Q) ~ 0 ^ r0(P) A ri(Q) we may choose y ~ P if PC_ Q, y q~ p otherwise (in which case A -P c_C_ Q); and these are the only choices of y satisfying the implication for a~l x.
If the above conjecture were true, we could interpolate a formula $(x, y) of L. Up to equivalence with respect to 0 there are only four possibilities: $ is either x = y, x ~ y, logically true, or logically false. But, given (~, P, Q) ~ 0 ^ r0(P ) ^ r 1 (Q) and choosing y such that the above holds, the consequent of the implication is false for some x, the antecedent is true when x = y, and also the antecedent is true for some x different from y (in the case y $ P). Therefore no such formula ~ can interpolate in the above implication.
(d) A second question which arises is whether one lzan allow existential second-order quantifiers in the prefix and still get a first-order interpolant ~ (at least in (iii)). The following example, which looks forward to the definability applications of the next section, shows that this also is generally not possib!e.
Let L have just identity, and let R be a binary predicate symbol. Let 0(R) be the sentence of L(R) saying that R is a discrete linear order of the universe, Let o(x, y) be the formula of Ix(R) saying that x is the immediate predecessor ofy in the ordering R. Let r(R, P) be the following sentence of L(R, P):
qx[P(x) ~-~-(7 ::lz o(z,x) v 3z,y[P(z) A O(z,y) ^o(y,x)])] .
Thus, r(R, P) says that P is the set of "even-numbered" elements in the ordering R. For any (91, R) N 0(RT, there is some p c._: A such that (91, R, P) N r(R, P); but if R is, for example, a well-order then there is exactly one P such that (91, R, P) r(R, P). Hence the following holds:
3RVP, Q Vx([O(R)--* r(R, P)A P(x)] -~ [r(R, Q) ~ Q(x)] ).
More precisely, this implication holds for R if and only if R satisfies 0(R) and there is no infinite descending sequence { ag : k ~ 6o } such that a k + 1 is the immediate predecessor of a k. Now, if we could get an interpolating formula ~(R, x) of L(R), this would define the unique P satisfying r(R, P) for some R for which such a P is unique. But whenever A is infinite and (91, R, P) ~ 0(R) A r(R, P) we can find (~', R', P') such that (91, R, P) = (~d', R'~ P'), but I{P" c_ A"(P[',R',P') ~ (91', R', P")}I = 2 IA'[ Therefore no such P can be first-order definable, a~ad so interpolation fails.
(e) One sort of improvement in interpolation results which we have not considered is that of relating the syntactical form of the interpolant ¢ to that of the formulas ¢ and X between which it interpolates. However, by combining the known results of that kind with ours, we also obtain some improvements in that line.
For example, Lyndon [ 12] proved that Theorem 1.2 could be improved by adding to (it) that (1) a predicate which occurs positively (negatively) in ¢ also occu.'s positively (negatively) in both ¢ and ×. (See [ 12] for the definition of positive and negative.) Using this we can obtain, for example, an improvement of 
.,z n (--]3zo(z,y O) nero A A [o(Yi, Zi) AO(zi,Yi+l) ] A O(Zn,X)) . O<i~n
Can this always be done? That is, given qJ(R, S 1 , x) and ×(R, S 2 , x), finitary first-order formulas such that
can we find some infinitary (first-order) formula ~(R, x) (not containing S1, $2) such that
By "infinitary" we intend primarily one of.the classical languages L~x or something similar; in the above example ¢ belongs to L t~.j 10.~ • (For information and further references on infinitary language.,; see [21 ] and the volume in ;¢hich [ 10] appears.) We should remark, however, that the analogous generalization of Lemma 3.I (that is, replacing :ly by a second-order existential quantifier and finding an infinitary o) is false. § 4. Definability
The main result of this section is the following gener'dization of Beth's theorem, which will be derived as all application of Theorem 3.2. Proof. It is easy to see that (ii) n implies (i) n -for any 92 pick a I , ..., a k ~ A satisfying o; then any Pc Mr(9.I) must be one of sets defined by ¢i (x, a 1 , ..., ak ), i = 1, . .., n, and so IMr(ff)l <._ n. To prove that (i) n implies (ii) n we first apply compactness and so assume that T is given by a single sentence r(P) of L(P). (Actually this is not necessary if one is willing to use the infinitary form of the interpolation results.) What we will do is show, assuming (i) n holds, that (*) there are formulas I~i(P , v 1 . 
., a,_l).
Similarly we may assume that Pn-1 ~P/f°reachi=l,---,n-2, and findan_l+ i E Pn-t -Pi fori = 1, ..., n -2. Then, defining ~2(P, Ol, ..., O2n_ 3 ) to be -I ~t ^ P(vn)/x ... ^ P(o2n_3) , we know that Pn-1 is the only set Pc MT(~ .) such that (gJ, P) ~ ffz(P, al, ...,a2n_3 ) .
Continuing in this fashion we obtain all @i, i -1, ..., n. It is then clear from their definitions that (*) holds. Therefore the theor~m is proved.
Note that for n = 1 this does give Beth's Theorem 1. !, and also that the proof works for T a theory in any language containing L(P).
The problem of finding an equivalent to (i) n was first raised by Craig in [ 5 ] . Later he and Daigneault considered this question and formulated a condition, similar to our (ii) n but much more complicated, which they proved equivalent to (i) n for theories T in L(P). Their methods, which did not work for theories T in arbitrary languages containing L(P), are much different and much more involved than those used here or in § 6 below. The author is grateful to Professor Craig for sending him an account of their (unpublished) work.
Just as Svenonius' theorem may be derived from Beth's, a corresponding generalization of Sven•nius' theorem may be derived from Theorem 4.1. The semantic condition concerns M(9/, P) rather than Mr(91 ) , and the syntactical condition states that some finite disjunction of the corresponding conditions of Theorem 4.1 is a consequence of T. Combining these two results we obtain the following, which, like the Chang-Makkai theorem, is a generalization of both Beth's and Svenonius' theorems. A natural question to ask is whether the individual parameters v 1 , ..., v~c are necessary in (ii) n of Theorem 4.1, or whether a disjunction of explicit definitions (as in Svenonius' theorem) would suffice. Equivalently, this asks whether the condition that IMT(92 )1 < w for all 92 implies that IM(9~, P)I = 1 for every model ( 92, P) of T. In general, the answer to this question is no, as is shown by the following example.
Assume that L has just a binary predicate E. Let T be the theory in L(P) which says that E is an equivalence relation which divides the universe into two infinite equivalence classes, and P is one of these equivalence classes. Then T is a complete theory satisfying the conditions in Theorem 4.1 with n = 2, but P cannot be defined without parameters (there are models ( 92, P) of T such that IM( 9~, P)I = 2). A definition of P with parameters is given by
However, there is a large class of theories T for which the parameters are not necessary. This is the case whenever T satisfies the following "choice" condition: It should be noted that whether or not T satisfies (C) depends only on the consequences of T in L. So if T O is any theory of L ~atisfying (C), then any extension of T O in any language also satisfies (C). This is the case, for example, wher~ T O is Peano arithmetic.
Before going on to a few other applications, let us survey some of the kinds of model-theoretic condition concerning a predicate P which are equivalent to some condition stating the e×p!icit definability of P. In what follows we drop our notation about M r (~[) and instead write the conditions as second-order sentences; r here is a first-order formula which varies from condition to condition. The equivalent definability conditions have either been given previously or are easily obtainable from what we have done previously.
Thus, Beth's theorem gives a definability condition equivalent to (1) p 3 -<l Pr.
The immediate effect of our interpolation Theorem 3.2 is to enable us to give a definability equivalent also to (2) ~ 3y 3 ~l Pr.
But we showed in Theorera 4.1 that using a variant of (2) we actually find a condition equivalent to (3) ~ 3 -<n Pr.
Using Theorem 3.4 instead of 3.2 we get a definability equivalent to (4) ~ 3y~j VR 0 ... 3y k ~/R k =t <n Pr.
Craig's improvement in Beth's theorem may be expressed here as generalizing ( 1 ) to
and adding that the definition of P does not involve S. More geaerally, recalling Remark (e) from § 2, we can replace 3 S by any sequence of quantifiers, provided the second-order quantifiers are all existential. In particular, then, (4) becomes other than those in the previous theorems and the Chang-Makkai theorem can possibly hold. It follows that those are also the only possible cardinality restrictions on P in (1)-(4') above. Hence they cannot be further generalized by altering the cardinality condition.
(b) The example in Remark (d) of § 3 shows that ~ 3 R 3 -<1 p r need not imply that P is first-order definable (in terms of some R). Hence (4) and (4') cannot be generalized by allowing existential second-order quantifiers to the left of P. One may similarly show that universal second-order qufintifiers cannot be allowed to the right of P. However, the question of the infinitary definability of P in these cases, as raised in Remark (f) of the last section, is open. In general it seems that obtaining further definability results requires looking at different types of conditions than those above° Indeed, very many different types of results follow simply from other applications of the interpolation theorems. Without attempting any comprehensive survey of such results, we give here two interesting and related examples of such appiications.
The first re, suit is an apparently new consequence of Craig's interpolation theorem. The other result, an application of Theorem 3.3, also deals with a particular way in which P can be definable with parameters. Proof. We first show that (ii) implies (i). Assuming (ii), let P ~ 41T( ~ ) and let a be a point in P which defines P as in the first line of (ii). Assume that a ~ P:~¢ MT(gJ). Ther: by the second line of (ii) we have (gA, P'~ ~ Vx[P(x) --~ ~6(x, a)] and so P' c_ p. Repeating the argument with a point a' ~ -P' we find that also P c_= p' and so P = P', which shows (i).
To show that (i) implies (ii) notice that (i) implies (after changing Q to P)~ and
Combining (2) (a) and (c) we ~et
w!hich because of (2) (b) yields
which completes the proof. Finally, we also have the following result which, although not explicitly mentioning definability, is a consequence of Theorem 4.1. Notice that this result clearly fails if T is allowed to be a theory in a language containing L(P). The theorem with the weaker conclusion that IMr(~)l _> 2 is an immediate consequence of Beth's theorem. It is given and applied oy K.L.de Bouv~re in his book [24] .
For other sorts of results the reader is also referred to Chang But a definable set in a special naodel either has the power of the model or is finite (since special models are universal; cf. [ 1 f] Theorem 3.7). Hence for each i there is some n such that ~ ~ 3 <_n x ¢i(x), which proves the Lemma.
As an almost immediate consequence of this Lemma we derive a theorem of Park characterizing the sets Y c__ A closed under the above notion of defipability. • 4ow define ¢n to be X(X, v I , ..., vn_ 1 ). Then I, al , . .. , an_ 1 ))= 0. So if
